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CAN EQUALITY SURVIVE EXCEPTIONS? 
Daphne Barak-Erez* †
I. The Significance of Exceptions 
The meaning of the exception vis-à-vis the general rule is primarily dis-
cussed in the context of emergency powers (following Cart Schmitt and 
Giorgio Agamben). But the complicated relationship between the norm and 
its exceptions is also relevant to other legal contexts. This Commentary is 
dedicated to the following question: What are the implications of consider-
ing equality a fundamental legal principle while recognizing exceptions to 
its application? More concretely, how does the existence of exceptions in-
fluence the understanding and viability of equality as the norm?  
Evaluating this question with the focus on equality is especially valuable 
because the right to equality is especially sensitive to the impact of deroga-
tions from it. Several rights, like privacy, can be compromised in some 
areas and still retain their viability in other contexts. In contrast, one cannot 
treat an individual in a discriminatory manner in one area while retaining his 
egalitarian status as a full citizen. Furthermore, the right to equality is espe-
cially susceptible to different understandings, and these serve as 
justifications for some of the exceptions. 
This Commentary uses Israeli protection of gender equality as an exam-
ple to study the question presented. Later, it broadens the lessons drawn 
from this example for the purpose of exploring other contexts.  
II. Gender Equality in Israeli Law: A Norm Subject to Exceptions 
In Israel, equality has been recognized as a foundational constitutional 
principle since the early days of the state. Israel’s Declaration of Independ-
ence from 1948 includes a promise that the state “will ensure complete 
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race or sex.” This vision and its express application to gender 
equality, which were far from being self-evident in the world during that 
time, have left their mark on significant laws enacted in Israel’s formative 
years. Examples of this include the Defense Service Law, 1949, which ap-
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The Creeping Influence of the Exceptions—In practice, exceptions to the 
rule of gender equality are often treated as justifications for additional dis-
plied mandatory military service to both men and women, and the Equal 
Rights to Women Law, 1951.  
At the same time, the Israeli legal system has recognized and applied 
exceptions to this principle since its beginning. Proponents suggest that 
some of these exceptions reflect allegedly natural differences between men 
and women, and hence are not exceptions to equality. However, from a lib-
eral perspective—denying stereotypical distinctions based on group 
affiliations—they are clearly exceptions to the equality principle.  
These exceptions have arisen in several instances. First, for many years, 
following the British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, Israel did not 
recognize the possibility of judicial review of legislation that did not con-
form to the basic principles of the system, including the principle of gender 
equality. In practice, Israeli legislation includes instances of different alloca-
tions of rights for men and women. In the context of mandatory military 
service for both sexes, the law has different provisions based on gender re-
garding length of service and exemptions from service. In addition, as a 
matter of a political compromise, Israel applies the religious law of the indi-
viduals involved in marriage and divorce. For practical purposes, this results 
in the application of religious regimes that do not conform with current un-
derstandings of equality (especially regarding control over the decision to 
divorce, which is disproportionately given to men in the traditions of the 
main religions of the country).  
Second, this double-edged attitude toward equality survived the later 
development of Israeli constitutional law, which has adopted judicial review 
of legislation. When Israel accepted its new basic laws on human rights (Ba-
sic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty)—a form of legislation that prepares the chapters of the country’s 
future constitution—there was a political concern regarding the impact of a 
full constitutional protection of equality (which had the potential to threaten 
delicate compromises, such as the law of marriage and divorce). Accord-
ingly, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not mention equality in 
an express manner (leaving open only the option to infer it from other con-
stitutional provisions, such as the protection of human dignity, as the 
Supreme Court has done in later decisions). Additionally, this basic law 
applies only to new legislation, and hence awards former laws immunity 
from direct judicial review.  
III. The Consequences of the Exceptions for Gender Equality in 
Israeli Law and Strategies for Coping with Them 
This Commentary addresses how the Israeli legal system has coped with 
the double message of accepting and denying gender equality at the same 
time. For this purpose, the Commentary examines the long-term influence 
of the exceptions to the norm, on one hand, and the strategies used to cope 
with these effects, on the other hand. 
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b. Denying the Precedential Value of the Exceptions—Following 
the same rationale, when the Supreme Court interprets laws, it 
focuses on the principle, not on the exceptions. Accordingly, in 
the Poraz and Shakdiel cases, the Israeli Supreme Court en-
dorsed equality even though the issues involved the regulation of 
law and religion—an area susceptible to exceptions. The Court 
applies this judicial method even when the legislative approach 
is explicitly non-egalitarian. For example, in Milo v. Minister of 
Defense, where the Court decided whether to recognize an ar-
gument for the right of women to be exempt from military 
service for secular conscientiousness reasons (although the law 
did not grant this right to men), it invoked the principle of gen-
der equality in flatly rejecting the interpretation offered to 
support this result. The court did that without giving weight to 
the fact that the law on military service included many other ex-
emptions from service that apply only to women (exemptions 
given mainly to married women, mothers, and religious women), 
and hence may serve as a basis to distinguish between men and 
women conscientiously objecting to service. 
tinctions between men and women, especially in institutional contexts tradi-
tionally involved in gender discrimination (e.g., military and religious 
institutions). For example, although the Defense Service Law does not in-
clude limitations on the participation of women in combat duties, the 
different regulation of the service of men and women was considered a tra-
ditional justification for this policy. Even when this policy was attacked in 
Miller v. Minister of Defense, it was not challenged in a sweeping manner. 
Rather, the challenge insisted on the right of women to volunteer for mili-
tary positions. More examples come from the regulation of religion and 
state. The legislation in this area disqualifies women from certain religious 
positions of official nature (e.g., Chief Rabbis and Municipal Rabbis), but 
not from other religion-related government positions (e.g., members of reli-
gious councils). However, in practice, women were excluded from the latter 
as well. This discrimination was gradually abolished only after long legal 
struggles in such cases as Poraz v. Tel Aviv Municipality and Shakdiel v. 
Minister for Religious Affairs.  
The possibility to engage in the initiative of enacting basic laws on hu-
man rights without expressly mentioning equality reflects, once again, the 
fact that the long standing exceptions left their mark on the attitude toward 
equality as a foundational principle. At the same time, this drafting choice 
contributed and enhanced the compromising attitude toward the right to 
equality. 
Strategies to Limit the Impact of the Exceptions—A close study of judi-
cial precedents and legal activism outside the court reveals several strategies 
that diminish the impact of the exceptions. 
a. Equality as an Interpretive Principle—the Israeli Supreme Court 
regards equality as a governing interpretive principle. Accord-
ingly, it conforms laws to the ideal of gender equality when the 
text is susceptible to such interpretation. 
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The Israeli case study has the potential to shed light on the dilemma of 
promoting equality in other contexts, such as the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The 
Convention, which came into force in 1981, has been signed and ratified by 
the vast majority of the countries in the world. However, many of these 
countries ratified the convention subject to reservations that apply to major 
areas of importance to gender equality, including reservations that give ex-
press priority to customs and traditions. This reality calls to mind the same 
dilemma previously discussed in the context of Israeli law: Can equality 
survive these exceptions? More concretely, is equality promoted when the 
c. Promoting Equality Jurisprudence in Areas Not Infected by Ex-
ceptions—The Israeli Supreme Court has drafted its most 
important equality precedents in areas that are relatively free 
from ideological controversies regarding equality. These prece-
dents largely come from the area of equal opportunities at work 
(for example, Nevo v. National Labor Court). In these areas, 
women activists have even succeeded in pushing forward very 
impressive reforms regarding affirmative action and representa-
tion of women in government positions through amendments to 
various statutes, such as the Government Companies Law and 
the State Service law, and court decisions, such as Israel 
Women’s Network v. Government of Israel. 
d. Promoting Equality Through Other Mediating Values—Since 
equality is considered a “suspect” value in some contexts, activ-
ists have realized that women’s rights can be more effectively 
promoted when initiatives are not exclusively justified on equal-
ity grounds. For example, they promoted harsher policies in the 
area of domestic violence without directly connecting the strug-
gle to equality. Similarly, Israel’s advanced sexual harassment 
law (Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998) is drafted in a 
manner that emphasizes its connection to the constitutional value 
of human dignity—a value to which religious people can con-
nect (Section 1 of the law states that “the purpose of this law is 
to prohibit sexual harassment in order to protect human dignity, 
liberty and privacy and to promote equality between the sexes.”). 
It is interesting to point out the difference between the develop-
ments in these areas in the United States and in Israel. In the 
United States, since there was no question about formal support 
for equality, the route for recognizing the ability to sue for sex-
ual harassment was a broad interpretation of the right to equality 
as enacted in Title VII. In contrast, Israel’s sexual harassment 
prohibitions (including criminal sanctions) received express 
support in legislation and by politicians who would otherwise 
have been unlikely to unconditionally support equality in other 
contexts. 
IV. The Norm and Exception Duality and Gender Equality  
in the Global Context 
BARAK-EREZ FI FINAL COPY.DOC 3/27/2009 2:44 PM 
138 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 107:134 
 
international norm of gender equality has been adopted subject to excep-
tions? Will the long run be influenced by the norm or by the exceptions? 
What will be the enduring impact of the exceptions on the norm? Formally, 
states are not allowed to add reservations that run against the core provi-
sions of the convention. However, the international practice regarding 
CEDAW tends not to meet this rule. 
Additionally, the norm-exceptions dilemma has special relevance to the 
debate over feminism and multiculturalism. To quickly sketch the argument, 
since many cultures have discriminatory components, there are different 
views on how to choose between women’s rights and respect for cultural 
rights of groups. On the two extremes of this debate, one finds those who 
reject any cultural trait that does not pass the equality test and those who 
oppose any equality reform that necessitates intervention in cultural tradi-
tions—and there are many shades of grey in between. The Israeli experience 
is very relevant to this debate, especially in countries with high immigration 
(like Canada), where proposals seek to recognize the operation of commu-
nity tribunals in the area of family law. From the perspective of this 
analysis, it is important to engage in this debate with reference to the poten-
tial of the exception to reshape the norm. 
